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NOTES AND COMMENT
Bills and Notes: Words "as per contract" may be either construed to qualify the promise to pay or as reference to the consideration.-In a somewhat recent case the International Finance
Corporationv. Calvert Drug Co. 124 Atl. 891. (Maryland) the facts
material are as follows: The Reolo Inc. and the Calvert Drug Co.
entered into a contract by which the Reolo Inc. were to supply the
Calvert Drug Co. a quantity of medicine to be shipped from time to
time. The Reolo Inc. drew two notes on the Calvert Co. which the
latter accepted in the following manner, "accepted for payment as per
Reolo contract." The contract stated that the notes should become
null and void if the contract was not performed. The Reolo Inc. had
these notes discounted by the International Finance Corporation. The
contract was never performed and the Finance Corporation protested
the notes. The court construed the words "as per contract" to qualify
the promise to pay because they were so situated that it was clear that
the parties intended these words as qualification of the promise to pay
rather than as a mere reference to the consideration. Under Section 141
of the Negotiable Instruments Act "acceptance is qualified which is,
i-conditional-that is to say, which makes payment by the acceptor
dependent on the fulfillment of a condition therein stated."
The Wisconsin Negotiable Instruments Act, section 116.02 provides
as follows: An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the
following requirements: .

. .

. It must contain an unconditional prom-

ise or order to pay a certain sum in money." Where words are used
which qualify or limit this promise to pay, the instrument which otherwise is negotiable is rendered nonnegotiable and is subject to the equities
which exist between the original parties. The word "payable" followed
by "subject to the policy," 2 "in consideration of and subject to" a certain
3
contract existing between the maker and the payor "subject to the
provisions contained in an agreement this day made between" the
5
parties, 4 "as per contract dated March 24, 1913" or "value received,
of October 25,
payee
subject to terms of contract between maker and
'Wis.

Stat. 1923, ch. 116, sec. ii6.o2.

'American. Ex. Bmk v. Blanchard, 7 Allen 333 (Mass.)
'McComas v. Haas, lO7 Ind. 512; 8 N.E. 579.
"Dilley v. Van Wie, 6 Wis. 209.
"Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Times Pub. Co., 76 So. 612, in which the
court decided that the words "rent for month of August, 1915, for part of brick
building on comer of Marshall street and alley, in Shreveport, as per contract
dated March 24, 1913" operated to qualify the promise to pay. Provosty J.
dissenting.
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19o5"0 and other similar words- have been construed to qualify and limit
the promise to pay, thus rendering the instrument nonnegotiable. Some
courts base their decision on the fact that the intention of the original
parties was to make the instrument nonnegotiable8 but the majority
of the courts base their opinion on the construction of the particular
words used without regard to the intention of the parties. Some
courts thus construe the particular words used to limit and qualify
the promise to pay while others construe them as merely stating the
mere transaction out of which the note arose or merely referring to the
consideration and not to the promise to pay.
The Negotiable Instruments Act 9 provides that an unqualified order
or promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this chapter,
though coupled with: . . . . "A statement of the transaction which
gives rise to the instrument." An instrument therefor will not be reduced to a non-negotiable instrument by the mere statement of the
consideration or by a reference made thereto. So the words "value
received as per contract," written into the body of the instrument will
not render it nonnegotiable because it refers to the consideration and not
to the promise to pay and is a mere statement of the transaction out of
which the instrument arose.1 0 Words "as per contract" written on
'Manufacturer's Comnercial Co. v. Klots Throwing Co., 17o Fed. 311.
"Howard v. Kimball, 65 N.C. 175; 6 Am. Rep. 739. This is not followed by
the majority of the courts. The court held in this case that where a purchaser
of land, upon taking a bond for title, gives in payment therefor a note expressing
on its face that it is so given, the note itself will be notice of the vendee's equity
in case the title of the land shall prove defective, and an assignee or holder of
the note cannot in case of such defect in the title of the land, recover on the note
though he took it before it became due. Klots Throwing Co. v. Manufacturer's
Commercial Co., 179 Fed. 813,

1O3

C.C.A. 305, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 40.

In this

case the court held that the following note was nonnegotiable because the special
stipulation in the body of the note qualified the promise to pay;
3,I66.
New York, January I5, 19o6.
Six months after date we promise to pay to the order of Regenerated Cold Air
Company, thirty-one hundred and sixty-six oo/Ioo dollars at 487 Broadway, New
York City, with interest at six per cent per annum.
Value received, subject to terms of contract between maker and payee of
October 25, 19o5.
McClelland v. Norfolk South R. Co., xio N.Y. 469, 1 L.R.A. 299, 6 Am. St.
Rep. 397, 18 N.E. 237; in which the court held that where coupons payable to
bearer, refer to the bonds for the interest on which they are issued and the bonds
refer to the mortgage securing them, for conditions limiting or explaining them,
the coupons are not negotiable.
'Bank v. Michael, (N.C.) i S.E. Rep. 855; where it was held that the recital
in a bond of the following did not destroy its negotiability: "it being the balance
of the purchase money for one hundred and forty-three acres of land at Reedy
Creek,'--that this referred to the consideration for which the bond was given.
'Wis. Stat. 1923, ch. ii6, see. 16.o7.
"ANational Bank of Newbury v. Wentworth (ii8),
lO5 N.E. 626, 218 Mass.
30. Waterbury-Wallace Co. v. Ivey, 163 N.Y.S. 719, 99 Misc. Rep. 26o.
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the back of the note under which the payee indorsed at the time of
negotiation does not effect the negotiability" nor do the words "for
value received in one machinery as per contract" render the note nonnegotiable. 12 It has been further held that the words "this note is given
in accordance with the terms of a certain contract under the same date,
between the same parties,"'13 also the words "this note is given in
accordance with a land contract of even date between B and C" do not
destroy the negotiability of the instrument. 14
The cases referred to in this comment will show that some courts
hold that a particular word or number of words destroy the negotiability
of an instrument while other courts decide that they do not.
There seems to lie no uniform or hard and fast rule of law to follow
in construing instruments which have all the essentials of negotiability
with some added words. It resolves itself down to a question of construction for the courts. Where the words "subject to" are in the instrument
the courts have almost uniformly held that they clearly show the intention of the parties to make the instrument contingent upon some
extrinsic document thus rendering the promise to pay dependent and
qualified.
The general rule evident from all of the cases reviewed seems to be:
Where an instrument otherwise negotiable expressly refers to an extrinsic document so as to indicate that the promise to pay is to be
burdened with the terms of such extrinsic document it is notice sufficient to put the holder on inquiry and renders the instrument nonnegotiable, but if such extrinsic document is not to effect the instrument
until after maturity it will not destroy the negotiability of the instrument.
M. T. L.
Contracts: Manner in which question whether contract is entire
may arise.-In the recent case of Fuller v. Ringling, 202 N. W. 183
(XVis.), a real estate broker, who procured a purchaser of. a part of
land, described in a non-exclusive contract, was held to be entitled
to a commission, even though the contract was entii-e and was not
fully performed by the broker, where complete performance was
rendered impossible by the owner's sale of another part of the property.
There are at least six different ways in which questions may arise
as to whether a contract is entire or severable.' (i) Such a question
may arise in connection with the sufficiency of a consideration on
the one side to support two or more convenants on the other. For
example, where a common carrier requires a shipper to pay regular
rates and also assent to a limitation of the carrier's common law
"Snelling Slate Bank v. Clausen, 132 Minn. 404, 157 N.W. 643.
2 First Nat. Bank v. Badhan, 86 S.C. 170, 68 S.E. 536, 138 Am. Rep. lO43.
"Markey v. Corey, io8 Mich. 184, 66 N.W. 493, 33 L.R.A. 117, 62 Am.St.
Rep. 698.
"'Doyle v. Consdine, 195 Ill. App. 311.
' Page on Contracts,Vol. 4, page 2084-

